In 1972, a teenage boy in Oklahoma wanted to buy a beer—and ended up changing constitutional law.
The beer in question wasn’t even strong. Oklahoma allowed 18-year-old women to buy “near beer”—3.2% alcohol by volume. But young men had to wait until they turned 21. Curtis Craig was 18 and thought that was unfair. So he sued the state, arguing that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the time, that was a long shot.
For decades, the Supreme Court had treated laws that distinguished between men and women as no big deal. If a law seemed “reasonable,” that was usually enough. States could say women were too delicate to work long hours, or that men didn’t belong in caregiving professions. Courts mostly shrugged. That deferential standard (rational basis review) meant lawmakers didn’t need much justification at all.
But by the 1970s, things were changing.
The feminist movement was gaining strength. Title IX had just been passed, banning sex discrimination in education. More women were entering the workforce. And the Equal Rights Amendment had passed Congress, even though it hadn’t yet been ratified by the states. The country was rethinking old assumptions about gender, and so was the Court.
Craig v. Boren (1976) became the case that captured that shift.
What the Court Decided
In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court struck down Oklahoma’s beer law. But the big news wasn’t just the result—it was how the Court got there.
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, announced a brand-new standard of review for laws that classify based on sex: intermediate scrutiny.
Here’s what that means in plain English:
“Classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”
Not just some reason. Not just convenience. The government had to show a solid reason for treating men and women differently, and the law had to actually fit that goal.
Oklahoma had argued that the law helped promote traffic safety because young men were more likely to drink and drive. But Brennan looked closely at the evidence. The statistics showed only slight differences in alcohol-related arrests between men and women. That wasn’t enough. The Court said the law relied too heavily on crude generalizations, like the idea that all young men are reckless and all young women are responsible.
The Equal Protection Clause, Brennan wrote, doesn’t let states use gender as a blunt instrument. Individual rights require more precision.
The Other Opinions
Justice Powell agreed with the outcome but thought the Court had gone too far in announcing a formal new test. He preferred a slower, case-by-case evolution. His worry: if courts create rigid rules too quickly, they risk boxing in legislatures and missing the nuances of future cases.
Justice Stevens had a different take altogether. He didn’t focus much on the gender issue. For him, the Constitution is about treating people fairly, regardless of whether the law draws lines based on race, gender, age, or anything else. Labels matter less than fairness.
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, didn’t buy any of it. He said the state had a rational basis—public safety—and that should have been enough. He criticized the majority for creating a new legal test out of thin air, warning that it gave courts too much power to override democratic choices.
Why It Mattered
Craig was the first time the Supreme Court struck down a law for discriminating against men. That itself was significant. It showed that gender stereotypes cut both ways, and that equal protection wasn’t just about helping women.
But more importantly, it marked a turning point in constitutional law. The Court didn’t just say this law was bad. It changed the standard going forward. From this case on, laws that treat people differently based on gender would face a harder test. Not the hardest (strict scrutiny, used for race), but still serious. The government couldn’t just wave at tradition or trot out a few stats. It had to show that the distinction really mattered and that the law was doing what it claimed to do.
Intermediate scrutiny became the new normal for sex discrimination cases. It gave courts a tool to demand more from lawmakers without striking down every gender-based law on sight.
Why a Teenager with a Beer Mattered
Craig didn’t come out of nowhere. It was the product of years of movement lawyering, culture shifts, and evolving judicial attitudes. But it was also, at its heart, a reminder that constitutional change often begins in small, specific moments. A beer law. A high school student. A question of fairness.
It also shows something profound: that gender equality isn’t just about women’s rights—it’s about everyone’s right to be treated as an individual, not a stereotype.
Do you think the Court was right to create a new standard for sex-based classifications? Or should it have just stuck with either rational basis or strict scrutiny?