61. Men Can Care, Too
The nursing school case that cut through gender stereotypes
In 1979, a man named Joe Hogan applied to nursing school.
He was already a licensed nurse in Mississippi. He wanted to earn a bachelor’s degree in nursing from the state’s top public program—Mississippi University for Women. There was just one problem.
Despite being fully qualified, he was rejected.
Because he was a man.
The school’s policy was clear: it only admitted women to its undergraduate nursing program. That rule had been in place for decades. The state said it was trying to advance women’s opportunities in fields where they’d historically been excluded.
But Hogan wasn’t trying to take something away from women. He just wanted the same education they had access to.
So, he sued. And Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) became a major milestone in the Court’s evolving understanding of gender equality.
The Court Steps In
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in Hogan’s favor. The nursing school’s policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What’s especially striking is who wrote the majority opinion: Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the first woman ever appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. A woman who had fought her own battles against gender bias, including being passed over for jobs despite graduating near the top of her Stanford Law School class.
O’Connor didn’t pull punches.
She reminded the Court that sex-based classifications must meet intermediate scrutiny, the test created in Craig v. Boren just six years earlier. That means the state must show:
An important government objective, and
That the sex-based policy is substantially related to achieving that objective.
Mississippi said the nursing school’s women-only rule helped correct historical discrimination against women. But O’Connor saw through that.
“MUW’s policy of excluding males from admission to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job.”
In other words, Mississippi wasn’t correcting discrimination. It was reinforcing the very gender roles the Constitution is supposed to challenge.
Why the Case Mattered
This was one of the first times the Court said, clearly and unequivocally: laws that “help” women can still be discriminatory. Especially when they’re built on outdated assumptions about who should do what kind of work.
The state argued that it was promoting women’s opportunities in a historically female field. But the Court responded: gender-based exclusion—even if well-intentioned—isn’t justified if it closes doors based on assumptions about roles and abilities.
Joe Hogan wasn’t trying to take over the nursing field. He just wanted to go to school. But the law told him that, as a man, he didn’t belong in a caregiving profession. That message was harmful not just to Hogan, but to any person whose path didn’t line up with society’s gendered expectations.
The Bigger Picture
Hogan built on Craig in two important ways:
It confirmed that intermediate scrutiny was here to stay. The Court didn’t just use it—it clarified how seriously it needed to be applied. A vague nod to tradition or public policy wasn’t enough.
It showed that gender discrimination affects everyone. Not just women. Not just in obviously unequal scenarios. But in any context where laws rest on assumptions about how men and women “should” behave.
And perhaps most powerfully, it was the first woman Justice on the Court striking down a sex-based rule that discriminated against a man. O’Connor’s opinion sent a clear message: gender equality means no one gets boxed in by stereotype.
Why It Still Resonates
Think about how often we hear phrases like “women are natural caregivers” or “men aren’t nurturing.” Those ideas still shape laws, workplace policies, and cultural expectations today.
But Hogan reminds us: just because something sounds pro-woman doesn’t mean it’s promoting equality. If a rule denies people opportunities based on assumptions about gender roles, it’s not empowering—it’s limiting.
And that’s what the Constitution protects against.
Can laws that aim to help historically disadvantaged groups—like women—still be discriminatory if they rely on stereotypes? How should courts draw the line?
One key difference between Craig v. Boren and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan is the use of evidence. In Craig, the state relied on statistical data to argue that women were better suited to handle low-alcohol beer, whereas Hogan challenged a policy rooted in gender stereotypes without statistical justification. However, it's important to recognize that statistical data can be selectively presented or biased depending on the source, which raises concerns about its reliability in justifying discriminatory laws. This becomes especially problematic when due process and equal protection are overridden based on what the government deems important. While stereotypes do exist, using skewed data to support them risks undermining constitutional protections.