We’ve been studying Texas v. Johnson in my constitutional law class, a 1989 Supreme Court decision that struck down laws punishing people for burning the American flag. For most students, the case feels like a relic of another era, when flag-burning protests over Vietnam or Reagan-era policies made national news. But on August 25, President Trump issued a new executive order directing federal agencies to “prosecute the burning of the American flag to the fullest extent permissible.” Now, a case we would have read as history has become a live constitutional controversy.
The order opens with lofty, almost devotional language about the flag as “the most sacred and cherished symbol of the United States.” It frames flag burning as “a statement of contempt, hostility, and violence against our Nation,” and calls on the Justice Department to use every available legal tool—from criminal statutes on arson and disorderly conduct to immigration penalties for foreign nationals—to target acts of desecration. It promises to “restore respect and sanctity” to the flag, as if reverence could be legislated back into public life.
But the order also betrays an awareness of constitutional limits. It concedes that Johnson protects flag burning as symbolic speech, yet tries to carve out exceptions. It argues that the Supreme Court never held that flag desecration “likely to incite imminent lawless action” or that counts as “fighting words” is protected. On the surface, that sounds like a clever legal maneuver, a way to punish flag burning without directly contradicting Johnson. In reality, both exceptions are so narrow, and so rarely applied, that they offer almost no room for new prosecutions.
“Imminent lawless action” is the modern test for incitement, a category the Court defined during the Vietnam era to protect political speech from overbroad censorship. It applies only when words are intended and likely to spark immediate violence—like a speaker urging a crowd to attack right now. It’s hard to imagine a flag-burning protest meeting that threshold.
The “fighting words” doctrine is even more fragile. It comes from a 1942 case, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which upheld the arrest of a man who hurled personal insults at a police officer in the street. The Court described “fighting words” as speech so directly abusive that it provokes an immediate punch. But the Court hasn’t used that doctrine to uphold a conviction in over eighty years. Since then, it has protected Vietnam draft protests, racist rallies, and even Westboro Baptist Church’s hateful funeral demonstrations, all on the ground that offensive ideas, however painful, are still ideas.
Why has “fighting words” fallen out of use? Because over time, the Court recognized that protecting only polite or agreeable speech empties the First Amendment of its purpose. The test of free expression isn’t how we treat speech we admire, but how we handle speech that enrages us. A democracy cannot function if every insult or symbol of dissent becomes a trigger for prosecution. Modern courts assume that adults in a free society have a duty to tolerate offensive words, rather than silence them through law enforcement.
That history matters now. When an executive order declares that it will prosecute flag burning to “restore respect and sanctity” to the flag, it’s invoking the same logic that Johnson explicitly rejected: that the government may punish expression because it feels offensive, divisive, or unpatriotic. Wrapping that motive in the language of “law and order” or “fighting words” doesn’t change what it is: a viewpoint-based effort to police dissent.
The order doesn’t create a new crime, but it encourages prosecutors to stretch old ones and to see how far they can go in blurring the line between speech and sacrilege. That might win political points, but it risks something far greater: eroding the very freedom the flag is supposed to represent.



The executive order is clearly a violation of the First Amendment and the ruling in Johnson. I don't really understand the purpose of this executive order, as the article implies, reverence cannot be legislated back into public life. I do not think burning the flag on its own counts as imminent lawless action or as fighting words. The administration's actions concerning the First Amendment are very upsetting as we saw many student activists recently targeted. These are the exact situations the First Amendment is meant to protect against.
A lot of the thread is circling the conduct versus speech line, and rereading Johnson I don't think the Court really decided it there. It just took the conduct as expressive enough to get into the First Amendment and went straight to Texas's two interests. The breach of the peace one dropped out because no disturbance actually occurred or threatened to occur. The nationhood interest is what actually did the work, and the Court said those concerns "blossom only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates some message," which put the case "outside of O'Brien's test altogether." That feels like the part that matters for the order. The order's whole move is to point prosecutors at other laws, but under Johnson it isn't really about which law gets used, it's whether the interest behind the enforcement depends on the message. If it does, O'Brien drops out the same way it did for Texas.