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Lucas Smith's avatar

I believe the Skrmetti Court's refusal to engage with the dignity interests which anchored Obergefell and Romer was a serious error. Much of the majority's analysis which distinguished transgender identity from various suspect or quasi-suspect classes conflicts with this line of reasoning. The majority, in articulating the law's classifications as age and medical use, entirely disregards the harm to dignity and the badge of inferiority that accompanies a ban on the very category of medical care that is inextricably intertwined with transgender identity. Furthermore, the analysis distinguishing trans identity from other "immutable characteristics" disregards the harm to dignity which accompanies the suppression of one's transgender identity or gender dysphoria, which the majority acknowledges briefly before obviously dismissing it as irrelevant.

Nathaniel LaCross's avatar

I write mostly in regard to, and in the interest of (probably because I just read Skrmetti and had some thoughts less-tactfully scribbled in the margins), the article’s reference to Obergefell and Skrmetti. I appreciate the distinctions drawn between the cases’ decisions in spite of, to me, the similar central issues present. Obergefell and the cases which it stands upon, pioneered the approach of reviewing possible “animus” behind a statute, not granting it strict scrutiny, but at least reviewing whether the statute with less deference than otherwise where evidence suggests animus to have been a central purpose behind legislation. These cases pioneered this approach for the same reason that Skrmetti is reviewed with the most possible deference given to the Tennessee legislature and with the thickest societal blinders on the Court’s majority, the Court, as it mentions in the majority opinion, is very stringent regarding classifications of “insular minority status” and the strict scrutiny those arising cases necessitate.

Regardless of whether the Court should be more liberal in those classifications, the statute in Skrmetti should’ve at least been afforded the heightened review associated with statutes clearly based in large part upon animus. The statute, in spite of the good-faith face-value approach the majority takes in reading it, draws a strict line with regard to effect and delineation of prohibition. As is understood and uncontested throughout the opinion, the statute does not restrict minors from accessing gender affirming hormone therapy or treatment otherwise associated. Treatments and procedures which have no medical purpose otherwise, beyond the patient’s will that their physical manifestation matches their own perceived proximity to their gender/sex identity, are not prohibited to all. In Tennessee if you are a minor, so long as you are a girl, you may, with parental consent, undergo breast augmentation, you can still pump a boy full of the same “dangerous” and “risky” hormones and drugs that the Tennessee legislature so caringly prohibited to those wanting to do the same thing but dependent upon assigned sex at birth. The argument Roberts uses to refute this point underlines the distinct issue behind his misinterpretation. He argues, essentially, because girls can receive treatments that affirm the sex they were assigned at birth (but not those in adversity) as well as boys can access treatment affirming their assigned sex at birth, there is no issue implicating equal protection, however, he has the point backwards. The lack of equality comes with the legislated implication that one’s sex may determine which medical procedures they’re entitled to and gender-aesthetic ideals they are permitted to pursue. A century ago this court began enumerating the various intimate and impactful life decisions that one makes (regarding marriage, family planning, etc.) and recognizing that those decisions in themselves are intimate to oneself. In cases with minors, the typically-conservative “history and tradition” Court gives great deference to the assent of parents and doctors.

In Skrmetti, the Court had parental assent and that of a medical professional, but most importantly it possessed the extremely personal and intimate factor. Practically, there is no distinction between a young boy and a young girl being placed on hormone treatment therapy (given the same risks and dangers) with the sole goal to move toward, and live their life adherent to, a gendered-ideal, other than the one which the TN statute drew; that distinction is, assigned sex at birth when the treatment is incongruent with the Court’s view of alignment with one’s sex. To undergo a physical, or even medical, process so that the ideals one adheres to are better met or even just because one wishes to live their life in that way, a way that is totally insular and independent to oneself- their internal hormones and appearance- is a long accepted staple of American culture over the past 100 years. To draw a line in the sand simply based upon a perceived “risk of danger” apparently substantially dissimilar to other minors undergoing the same treatments, because one refuses to adhere to the perceived ideal of their assigned sex, surely cannot stand.

Here then, because I’m cynical, I view Skrmetti not as an execution of Constitutional doctrine and deference to past decisions, but as an example of the majority placing their hands over their eyes, like they’ve done many other times when confronted with insidious discrimination dolled up with a half-baked government interest. If they’d engage with each case of this nature, where animus is potentially a great motivating factor, and where the government’s stated interests are those so broad as “health and welfare” (which is apparently being unequally pursued here?) with their due societal context and critical analysis, rather than the blind deference with which the recent Court has been honoring state legislatures throwing together statutes which are insidious in prohibition and effect but have a “broad interest deference” polish, this case should’ve been resolved like Obergefell and those preceding. In much the same way that in earlier cases, concerning the topic of marriage rights for homosexual couples, the Court was weary to apply the heightened scrutiny the demographic was pragmatically and retrospectively due, due to the same adherence that this Court practices: the willful blinding of oneself to the severity and pervasiveness of discrimination against whichever demographics which the Court can pretend to ignore, because they've already been historically shunted and/or purposefully overlooked.

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