When Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) came down, it was a watershed moment for LGBTQ+ rights. The Supreme Court recognized that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry—not just for the sake of legal paperwork, but for the sake of dignity, belonging, and full citizenship. Justice Kennedy’s opinion was as much about constitutional principle as it was about human worth. He argued that liberty and equality are not separate boxes but “interlocking” protections—each strengthening the other when a group is excluded from a fundamental institution.
But marriage equality was never going to be the end of the story. It was the beginning of a new chapter, one in which that same logic is now being tested in the courts. The question is: how far does the Obergefell principle reach?
Let’s look at three of the most pressing frontiers: transgender rights, parental rights of LGBTQ+ couples, and religious liberty objections.
Transgender Rights: What the Court Said in Skrmetti
In United States v. Skrmetti (2025), the Supreme Court upheld Tennessee’s law banning gender-affirming medical care for minors. Senate Bill 1 (SB1) prohibits doctors from prescribing puberty blockers or hormone therapy to anyone under 18 if the purpose is to help them live as a gender different from their assigned sex at birth. It makes exceptions, however, for minors receiving those same medications for other reasons, like precocious puberty or certain congenital conditions.
Three transgender teens and their families challenged the law, arguing that it discriminates based on transgender status and violates equal protection. They claimed the law singled them out for disfavored treatment—not because of what medication they were getting, but because of who they are and what the treatment is for. The Biden administration joined the case in support of the families.
But the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, rejected that framing.
Roberts emphasized that the law does not ban treatments based on a child’s identity. Instead, he said, it draws two kinds of distinctions:
Age: Minors can’t get this kind of treatment; adults can.
Medical purpose: The same drug (like testosterone) is allowed for one condition but not another. A teen girl with excessive hair growth might be prescribed hormone therapy for that issue, but not for gender dysphoria.
In other words, Roberts said, the law wasn’t discriminating based on who the patient is, but why the treatment is being given. And because the law didn’t target a “suspect class” (like race or sex), the Court applied only the most deferential level of constitutional review: rational basis. That means the state only needed to show a plausible justification. Tennessee pointed to what it called serious medical risks, scientific uncertainty, and concerns about minors’ ability to consent—and the Court found that enough.
This is where the contrast with Obergefell becomes clear. In that case, the Court saw same-sex marriage bans as a form of deep constitutional harm. But in Skrmetti, the Court refused to extend that same dignity logic to transgender youth and gender-affirming care. Roberts’ opinion barely engaged with the idea of identity at all. Instead, he treated the case as a dispute over medical regulation, not constitutional status.
So even though Obergefell opened the door to protecting LGBTQ+ dignity through liberty and equality, Skrmetti shows that door is far from automatic when transgender rights are on the line.
Parental Rights: The Next Equal Protection Battle
Marriage is more than a ceremony—it’s a gateway to a whole host of rights, especially when it comes to family. After Obergefell, one of the clearest next steps was ensuring that same-sex couples would be treated equally as parents.
In Pavan v. Smith (2017), the Court reaffirmed this. Arkansas had refused to list both women in a married lesbian couple as parents on their child’s birth certificate. The Court reversed the state’s action without even holding oral argument, saying that Obergefell required equal treatment in all the rights and benefits of marriage, including parenthood.
But Pavan didn’t settle everything.
More recent cases have raised harder questions about what happens when same-sex couples rely on assisted reproduction, surrogacy, or non-biological parenting. For example, some states still resist automatically recognizing the non-biological parent in a lesbian couple, even if the couple is married and raising the child together. Others require extra legal steps, like second-parent adoption, that heterosexual couples using fertility treatments often don’t face.
These aren’t just bureaucratic hurdles. They send a message: your family doesn’t count the same way.
And once again, the Obergefell principle is being tested. If marriage equality truly means equal dignity, does that include equal recognition as parents from the moment a child is born? Or can states draw distinctions based on biology or tradition, even if they fall more heavily on LGBTQ+ families?
We’re likely to see more litigation on these issues in the coming years. How courts answer them will tell us whether Obergefell’s promise of equality extends beyond the altar.
Religious Liberty: The Coming Collision
The third arena is where LGBTQ+ rights meet religious liberty.
We’ve seen it play out in high-profile cases:
In Masterpiece Cakeshop (2018), the Court sided with a baker who declined to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, but emphasized that the state’s process had shown hostility toward his religious beliefs.
In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021), the Court unanimously ruled in favor of a Catholic foster agency that refused to certify same-sex couples, finding that the city hadn’t applied its non-discrimination policy neutrally.
In Kim Davis’s case—a Kentucky county clerk who refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples after Obergefell—courts wrestled with whether and how religious officials in public roles must comply with new constitutional rights.
In lawsuits involving therapists, healthcare providers, and religious colleges, courts have been asked whether individuals and institutions can claim faith-based exemptions from anti-discrimination rules.
What’s emerging isn’t a clean line but a patchwork. The Court has been reluctant to create a sweeping rule about when religious beliefs can override civil rights protections. Instead, it’s carved narrow paths that leave many questions unresolved.
One particularly fraught context is education. In Mahmoud v. Taylor, a diverse coalition of religious parents challenged a Maryland school district’s refusal to allow opt-outs from early elementary school lessons on gender and sexuality. The families argued that the materials carried a strong moral framing and that requiring their young children to celebrate the content without the ability to dissent or opt out violated their religious beliefs.
The case wasn’t about denying rights to LGBTQ+ individuals. It was about whether the state could require affirmation of certain values without any procedural accommodation for dissenting religious views. Still, the underlying tension is familiar: what happens when the dignity claims of one group come into direct conflict with the conscience claims of another?
What does it mean for the law to recognize dignity—and can it do so while also protecting deep disagreements?



I believe the Skrmetti Court's refusal to engage with the dignity interests which anchored Obergefell and Romer was a serious error. Much of the majority's analysis which distinguished transgender identity from various suspect or quasi-suspect classes conflicts with this line of reasoning. The majority, in articulating the law's classifications as age and medical use, entirely disregards the harm to dignity and the badge of inferiority that accompanies a ban on the very category of medical care that is inextricably intertwined with transgender identity. Furthermore, the analysis distinguishing trans identity from other "immutable characteristics" disregards the harm to dignity which accompanies the suppression of one's transgender identity or gender dysphoria, which the majority acknowledges briefly before obviously dismissing it as irrelevant.
I write mostly in regard to, and in the interest of (probably because I just read Skrmetti and had some thoughts less-tactfully scribbled in the margins), the article’s reference to Obergefell and Skrmetti. I appreciate the distinctions drawn between the cases’ decisions in spite of, to me, the similar central issues present. Obergefell and the cases which it stands upon, pioneered the approach of reviewing possible “animus” behind a statute, not granting it strict scrutiny, but at least reviewing whether the statute with less deference than otherwise where evidence suggests animus to have been a central purpose behind legislation. These cases pioneered this approach for the same reason that Skrmetti is reviewed with the most possible deference given to the Tennessee legislature and with the thickest societal blinders on the Court’s majority, the Court, as it mentions in the majority opinion, is very stringent regarding classifications of “insular minority status” and the strict scrutiny those arising cases necessitate.
Regardless of whether the Court should be more liberal in those classifications, the statute in Skrmetti should’ve at least been afforded the heightened review associated with statutes clearly based in large part upon animus. The statute, in spite of the good-faith face-value approach the majority takes in reading it, draws a strict line with regard to effect and delineation of prohibition. As is understood and uncontested throughout the opinion, the statute does not restrict minors from accessing gender affirming hormone therapy or treatment otherwise associated. Treatments and procedures which have no medical purpose otherwise, beyond the patient’s will that their physical manifestation matches their own perceived proximity to their gender/sex identity, are not prohibited to all. In Tennessee if you are a minor, so long as you are a girl, you may, with parental consent, undergo breast augmentation, you can still pump a boy full of the same “dangerous” and “risky” hormones and drugs that the Tennessee legislature so caringly prohibited to those wanting to do the same thing but dependent upon assigned sex at birth. The argument Roberts uses to refute this point underlines the distinct issue behind his misinterpretation. He argues, essentially, because girls can receive treatments that affirm the sex they were assigned at birth (but not those in adversity) as well as boys can access treatment affirming their assigned sex at birth, there is no issue implicating equal protection, however, he has the point backwards. The lack of equality comes with the legislated implication that one’s sex may determine which medical procedures they’re entitled to and gender-aesthetic ideals they are permitted to pursue. A century ago this court began enumerating the various intimate and impactful life decisions that one makes (regarding marriage, family planning, etc.) and recognizing that those decisions in themselves are intimate to oneself. In cases with minors, the typically-conservative “history and tradition” Court gives great deference to the assent of parents and doctors.
In Skrmetti, the Court had parental assent and that of a medical professional, but most importantly it possessed the extremely personal and intimate factor. Practically, there is no distinction between a young boy and a young girl being placed on hormone treatment therapy (given the same risks and dangers) with the sole goal to move toward, and live their life adherent to, a gendered-ideal, other than the one which the TN statute drew; that distinction is, assigned sex at birth when the treatment is incongruent with the Court’s view of alignment with one’s sex. To undergo a physical, or even medical, process so that the ideals one adheres to are better met or even just because one wishes to live their life in that way, a way that is totally insular and independent to oneself- their internal hormones and appearance- is a long accepted staple of American culture over the past 100 years. To draw a line in the sand simply based upon a perceived “risk of danger” apparently substantially dissimilar to other minors undergoing the same treatments, because one refuses to adhere to the perceived ideal of their assigned sex, surely cannot stand.
Here then, because I’m cynical, I view Skrmetti not as an execution of Constitutional doctrine and deference to past decisions, but as an example of the majority placing their hands over their eyes, like they’ve done many other times when confronted with insidious discrimination dolled up with a half-baked government interest. If they’d engage with each case of this nature, where animus is potentially a great motivating factor, and where the government’s stated interests are those so broad as “health and welfare” (which is apparently being unequally pursued here?) with their due societal context and critical analysis, rather than the blind deference with which the recent Court has been honoring state legislatures throwing together statutes which are insidious in prohibition and effect but have a “broad interest deference” polish, this case should’ve been resolved like Obergefell and those preceding. In much the same way that in earlier cases, concerning the topic of marriage rights for homosexual couples, the Court was weary to apply the heightened scrutiny the demographic was pragmatically and retrospectively due, due to the same adherence that this Court practices: the willful blinding of oneself to the severity and pervasiveness of discrimination against whichever demographics which the Court can pretend to ignore, because they've already been historically shunted and/or purposefully overlooked.