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Lucas Smith's avatar

I believe the Skrmetti Court's refusal to engage with the dignity interests which anchored Obergefell and Romer was a serious error. Much of the majority's analysis which distinguished transgender identity from various suspect or quasi-suspect classes conflicts with this line of reasoning. The majority, in articulating the law's classifications as age and medical use, entirely disregards the harm to dignity and the badge of inferiority that accompanies a ban on the very category of medical care that is inextricably intertwined with transgender identity. Furthermore, the analysis distinguishing trans identity from other "immutable characteristics" disregards the harm to dignity which accompanies the suppression of one's transgender identity or gender dysphoria, which the majority acknowledges briefly before obviously dismissing it as irrelevant.

Asma Uddin's avatar

You raise an important point about the dignity interests at stake. One distinction I’d encourage you to think about, though, is the relationship between dignity and the doctrinal framework the Court is applying. Neither Romer nor Obergefell established that a law implicating someone’s dignity automatically triggers heightened scrutiny. In fact, Romer is particularly interesting because the Court invalidated the law under rational basis review without recognizing sexual orientation as a suspect classification.

Maybe the stronger argument isn’t that the Court should have recognized transgender identity as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, but that even under rational basis review, it should have taken more seriously the possibility that the law reflects or reinforces prejudice against transgender people. How might the analysis change if we approached Skrmetti through Romer’s concern with animus rather than through the question of suspect classifications?

Nathaniel LaCross's avatar

I write mostly in regard to, and in the interest of (probably because I just read Skrmetti and had some thoughts less-tactfully scribbled in the margins), the article’s reference to Obergefell and Skrmetti. I appreciate the distinctions drawn between the cases’ decisions in spite of, to me, the similar central issues present. Obergefell and the cases which it stands upon, pioneered the approach of reviewing possible “animus” behind a statute, not granting it strict scrutiny, but at least reviewing whether the statute with less deference than otherwise where evidence suggests animus to have been a central purpose behind legislation. These cases pioneered this approach for the same reason that Skrmetti is reviewed with the most possible deference given to the Tennessee legislature and with the thickest societal blinders on the Court’s majority, the Court, as it mentions in the majority opinion, is very stringent regarding classifications of “insular minority status” and the strict scrutiny those arising cases necessitate.

Regardless of whether the Court should be more liberal in those classifications, the statute in Skrmetti should’ve at least been afforded the heightened review associated with statutes clearly based in large part upon animus. The statute, in spite of the good-faith face-value approach the majority takes in reading it, draws a strict line with regard to effect and delineation of prohibition. As is understood and uncontested throughout the opinion, the statute does not restrict minors from accessing gender affirming hormone therapy or treatment otherwise associated. Treatments and procedures which have no medical purpose otherwise, beyond the patient’s will that their physical manifestation matches their own perceived proximity to their gender/sex identity, are not prohibited to all. In Tennessee if you are a minor, so long as you are a girl, you may, with parental consent, undergo breast augmentation, you can still pump a boy full of the same “dangerous” and “risky” hormones and drugs that the Tennessee legislature so caringly prohibited to those wanting to do the same thing but dependent upon assigned sex at birth. The argument Roberts uses to refute this point underlines the distinct issue behind his misinterpretation. He argues, essentially, because girls can receive treatments that affirm the sex they were assigned at birth (but not those in adversity) as well as boys can access treatment affirming their assigned sex at birth, there is no issue implicating equal protection, however, he has the point backwards. The lack of equality comes with the legislated implication that one’s sex may determine which medical procedures they’re entitled to and gender-aesthetic ideals they are permitted to pursue. A century ago this court began enumerating the various intimate and impactful life decisions that one makes (regarding marriage, family planning, etc.) and recognizing that those decisions in themselves are intimate to oneself. In cases with minors, the typically-conservative “history and tradition” Court gives great deference to the assent of parents and doctors.

In Skrmetti, the Court had parental assent and that of a medical professional, but most importantly it possessed the extremely personal and intimate factor. Practically, there is no distinction between a young boy and a young girl being placed on hormone treatment therapy (given the same risks and dangers) with the sole goal to move toward, and live their life adherent to, a gendered-ideal, other than the one which the TN statute drew; that distinction is, assigned sex at birth when the treatment is incongruent with the Court’s view of alignment with one’s sex. To undergo a physical, or even medical, process so that the ideals one adheres to are better met or even just because one wishes to live their life in that way, a way that is totally insular and independent to oneself- their internal hormones and appearance- is a long accepted staple of American culture over the past 100 years. To draw a line in the sand simply based upon a perceived “risk of danger” apparently substantially dissimilar to other minors undergoing the same treatments, because one refuses to adhere to the perceived ideal of their assigned sex, surely cannot stand.

Here then, because I’m cynical, I view Skrmetti not as an execution of Constitutional doctrine and deference to past decisions, but as an example of the majority placing their hands over their eyes, like they’ve done many other times when confronted with insidious discrimination dolled up with a half-baked government interest. If they’d engage with each case of this nature, where animus is potentially a great motivating factor, and where the government’s stated interests are those so broad as “health and welfare” (which is apparently being unequally pursued here?) with their due societal context and critical analysis, rather than the blind deference with which the recent Court has been honoring state legislatures throwing together statutes which are insidious in prohibition and effect but have a “broad interest deference” polish, this case should’ve been resolved like Obergefell and those preceding. In much the same way that in earlier cases, concerning the topic of marriage rights for homosexual couples, the Court was weary to apply the heightened scrutiny the demographic was pragmatically and retrospectively due, due to the same adherence that this Court practices: the willful blinding of oneself to the severity and pervasiveness of discrimination against whichever demographics which the Court can pretend to ignore, because they've already been historically shunted and/or purposefully overlooked.

Asma Uddin's avatar

I think one of your strongest points is that the distinction the majority draws between different medical purposes may itself reflect assumptions about how males and females are supposed to look. A girl can receive hormone treatment to address physical characteristics that depart from conventional expectations of femininity, while a transgender girl seeking similar physical changes is treated differently. The majority frames this as a distinction between medical diagnoses and purposes rather than sex, but your argument seems to be that those categories aren’t necessarily neutral. They may themselves reflect judgments about which forms of gender conformity are medically legitimate.

I think that’s a really interesting challenge to Roberts’s reasoning, because it raises the question of whether the state can avoid heightened scrutiny simply by defining permissible medical purposes in relation to a person’s sex assigned at birth.

Of course, the majority would respond that the different diagnoses involve different medical considerations and risk-benefit assessments, but that doesn’t necessarily resolve your underlying point about the role sex plays in the classification.

Linnie's avatar

I am curious about the bounds of discrete minority status in the court’s reasoning here. The majority opinion refuses to engage with the idea of transgender individuals as a distinct minority group, opting to regard this as a medical and age restriction. If the court can go around the protections given to minority groups by reframing the question, can the court go around the protections given to racial minorities or gender groups.

On the question of clashing protections, as a member of a minority religion, the court’s decisions to water down the protections to gay couples feels so disingenuous. My religious rights are not protected by a court led culture war on gay people. In my opinion, the furthering of legalized discrimination against any minority harms the security of all minority groups.

Asma Uddin's avatar

In principle, the criteria for suspect class status leave the Court quite a bit of interpretive discretion. It’s important to note - Racial and sex classifications have established constitutional protections, whereas transgender status has not been recognized as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification by the Court. So the Court isn’t starting from the same place in each instance.

But this raises an interesting question: if a group’s political power increases, or public attitudes toward it change, should that affect whether the group continues to receive heightened constitutional protection? And if so, does that make constitutional protection dependent on changing social and political circumstances?

Nina Catalfo's avatar

Skirmetti finding that the law didn’t target a “suspect class” (like race or sex), and applying rational basis review seems to be more of a decision based on the justices' personal views rather than an objective view. Other cases, like Blatt v. Cabela's Retail (even though it is not a Supreme Court case) hold that transexuality is indeed a sex-based classification, and such the Court should apply intermediate scrutiny as per Ginsburg's precedent. The religious freedom v. LGBT debate seems to also rest on the views of the justices themselves, and also should start a conversation about judicial discretion. It's interesting, because religious freedom is in the plain text of the First Amendment whereas rights from the due process clause are (in a textualist argument), are mostly unenumerated, but whether religious freedom indicates freedom to practice, or freedom to dismiss others' due process rights in favor of other peoples' comfort. Judicial discretion, as I've experienced at least, seems to damage the Justices' credibility, and makes the public think that they aren't truly applying the law as it is, and rather applies the Justices' personal views to various political topic and makes it the law.

Zach D's avatar

I found the last part of the article about the future collision with Religious Liberty to be the most interesting and thought provoking. It's easy to think about the historical development of these cases while not considering where we are going. Based on the Fulton and Cakeshop cases, it appears that the Court is placing a stronger weight on the First Amendment in the religious liberty space than on the 14th Amendment's SDP rights in Obergefell when there is a conflict. Given the current makeup of the Supreme Court, it seems likely that this trend will continue, with more holes being poked into Obergefell's holding and reasoning in future cases. While Justice ACB said last year that Obergefell is not at risk of being overturned due to reliance reasons, there seems to be some movement behind the scenes to the contrary.

Jonathan Mouw's avatar

I think the Court’s intense focus on determining the lack of heightened scrutiny in Skrmetti illustrates a dangerous departure from the principles of dignity, belonging, and citizenship that we see in Obergefell. I found it interesting that the dissent’s key focus, at least in the exerpt, didn’t fall on possible animus or rational-basis arguments for why the Court erred. Justice Sotomayor, in her dissent, aptly argues that the Court’s reasoning that SB1 doesn’t discriminate on sex is flawed, as the reasoning for banning treatment explicitly relies on sex. Therefore, based on my understanding of the text, her main point is to counter the majority's emphasis that SB1 simply classifies on age and medical use and should be rational-basis review. However, the Court should have applied at least intermediate scrutiny. If the Court was never going to establish a heightened level of scrutiny, I think the dissent could have focused more on Romer, where the Court determined that under a rational-basis review, Amendment 2 in Colorado, which barred the state and its municipalities from adopting any law or policy protecting people based on their sexuality, was unconstitutional. Here, in the excerpt at least, the dissent doesn’t mention that rational-basis review has been used to strike down an unconstitutional state amendment. Surprisingly, Thomas cites Romer to state that the Court never recognized sex discrimination as warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny. Although the Court in Obergefell and Romer didn’t find/use heightened scrutiny when dignity was at stake, I think the Court’s failure to acknowledge discrimination and animus makes rights like those established in Obergefell more precarious.

Troy Brinkel's avatar

I agree most notably with the last portion of this article titled: Religious Liberty - The Coming Collision. As somebody who attended public school, I never gave it much thought when all students would stand in the morning and recite the pledge of allegiance which includes "under god." Now, it appears the stakes have only grown. With Mahmoud, you see plaintiffs arguing that the public school is essentially forcing school lessons on gender and sexuality to children without allowing an opt out function. On the complete opposite end, you see examples like the Oklahoma Bible Education Mandate, which not only forced Bibles into every classroom but also mandated that teachers incorporate the bible into their teachings.

Obviously, this looms in the shadow of the first amendment, and one can hardly predict how the cross of religious freedom public education will play out. (cough, cough, Lemon made this much easier). Presumably cases in the near future will give us an answer.

Andrew Decker's avatar

As seen by the divisiveness in our current political system, it is not an easy task for the law to recognize dignity while resolving disagreements in an agreeable manner. I think one of the most important distinctions a court must make is whether a certain law is a negative right or positive right, and more importantly, the harms and alternatives available in each case. For example, in the cases regarding religious members not wanting to marry or bake a cake for LGBTQ+ couples, the court likely understood that both parties may be hurt by any manner of the court's resolution. The alternative of other community members or bakers being able to provide services for such couples may have led the court to hold in favor of the bakers and religious members, even though such a holding could be seen as a negative right against LGBTQ+ members. It makes me curious as to how many of these decisions actually rely on alternative options and whether the court stays consistent with that reasoning.

Anabelle Daly's avatar

When I first read Skrmetti, I was not thinking in terms of dignity from Obergefell. Yet now, I see the train of logic that was entirely missed by the majority in Skremetti. I agree with the article entirely that there a multiple intersecting rights at issue, including parental, religious, privacy, etc. What surprises me the most is that the majority decision in Skrmetti seemed to not address the well-established fundamental rights that intersect with minor access to transgender healthcare. If anything, the cold, detached logic in Skremetti reminded me a lot of Roe v. Wade and the emphasis on the medical procedure--avoiding the larger meaning of the right to access abortion healthcare, or in this case, transgender healthcare. As more cases reach SCOTUS, im curious to see if the Court will eventually address the larger meaning, the big picture affects on individual rights, access to transgender healthcare has. Specifically, Im curious if the transgender classification will evolve to the "double helix" EP + SDP logic we see from Windsor and Obergefell.

Zack S.'s avatar

It seems to me that the article is incorrectly framing Skrmetti as a departure from the logic used in Obergefell. It is clear in the article that the supreme court used dignity, belonging, and full citizenship to justify their right to marry. In my interpretation, both the terms of dignity and belonging look at the history of people and what the typical person should be able to expect out of civilization. The article seemed to claim that the discrimination of age was a departure from Obergefell because “in Skrmetti, the court refused to extend that same dignity logic to transgender youth and gender-affirming care. I think it is important to note that the SB1 blockers were only prohibited to anyone under 18. I do not find this to be a departure because of what role age plays into society. Though not specified in the article, there are common things in life such as voting, participating in the military, drinking alcohol, and many other aspects of life that require an age restriction, which is usually 18. If they were to prohibit the activity proposed in Skrmetti to all people I would agree that it contrasts Obergefell in terms of dignity logic. Here, they clearly are not overruling the act, but seeing that just like other elements of life, it would be best for society if the people partaking in this activity be 18.

Asma Uddin's avatar

You’re right that age is an important distinction, and that states generally have greater authority to regulate the activities and medical treatment of minors. But I’m not sure the comparisons to voting, drinking, or military service fully capture what’s happening in Skrmetti. Tennessee isn’t simply saying that minors cannot receive certain hormone treatments until they turn 18. Rather, the law permits some of those treatments for minors while prohibiting others depending on the purpose of the treatment, which is itself defined partly in relation to the patient’s biological sex.

So the question isn’t just whether states can impose age restrictions, which they clearly can, but whether the distinctions they draw among minors are constitutionally permissible. The fact that a law applies only to minors doesn’t automatically resolve the equal protection question.

Jack V's avatar

Reading Obergefell and seeing how its principles have evolved in subsequent cases (like Pavan) really brings out the differences between recognizing a constitutional right and ensuring that the legal protections and benefits that come with it are actually recognized. Clearly, Obergefell loses much of its significance if same-sex couples are still denied the legal benefits that ordinarily accompany marriage. I think this raises a concern regarding the majority's reasoning in Skrmetti, as it characterizes a law based on its stated distinctions rather than how those distinctions relate to the individuals affected. A similar approach to parental rights could allow states to justify unequal treatment of same-sex couples through facially neutral distinctions based on biology. While biological relationships can be relevant to determining parenthood, that justification becomes difficult to defend when states automatically recognize non-biological parents in heterosexual marriages while requiring same-sex couples to take additional legal steps. At that point, the distinction seems less about biology and more about the composition of the family itself. To me, Obergefell and Pavan illustrate why courts should look beyond how a state characterizes its classifications and consider whether those distinctions effectively deny certain groups the same legal protections afforded to others.

Yuna Chang's avatar

I think the article's hair-growth example goes against the majority's reasoning. The state allows hormone treatment that allows a teen girl to conform to beauty norms, receiving gender affirming treatment, but bans the use of that hormone treatment when it comes to transgender youth receiving gender affirming treatment. Although the court stated the "why" is different, I find it difficult to believe.

Brynn Lupo's avatar

The majority opinion in Skrmetti frames SB1 almost completely using medical reasoning instead of focusing on the individual. This skirts around the issue of heightened scrutiny in an attempt to give deference to the legislature with the rational basis test. This is a stark difference from the court in Obergefell that focused an equal protection discussion so deeply rooted in the individual. Because the majority's opinion in Skrmetti feels less personal and rooted in individual autonomy, it was likely easier for it to decide to use rational basis because it did not consider the factors so crucial in making decisions for suspect classes. I find the reasoning in Justice Barrett's concurrence to be particularly harmful. She reasons that the group of people with a transgender status is large and diverse instead of "discrete." A group with a characteristic such as transgender status can be diverse in other ways, but still have the characteristic of transgender status. This reasoning could apply to sex or groups of people with different races. This seems to dismantle what a "discrete" minority actually is.

Brandon Matthews's avatar

Before reading this article, I mostly thought of Obergefell as the final answer on same-sex marriage, but the author shows it was really more of a starting point. Once the Court recognized a right to marry, new questions came up about what that right includes, like parental rights and how it fits with religious liberty. The section on parental rights was interesting to me because it shows how marriage connects to so many other parts of life, such as being listed on a birth certificate or not needing extra legal steps to be recognized as a parent. The religious liberty section also showed how hard these cases can be, since both sides feel strongly that their rights are at stake. It makes sense that the Court has decided these cases narrowly instead of creating one big rule. It seems like many court decisions work this way, where one case settles a question but also opens up several new ones. It will be interesting to see how courts handle these issues in the future.

Clara Loveday's avatar

In law, recognizing dignity means recognizing the identities of individuals. A person’s identity can be made up of many different things including: beliefs, world views, experiences, culture, religion, and environment. However, the law can not always recognize the individual but it can represent individual groups and classes of people. I understand why the opinions/issues presented in the blog post are controversial.

In regard to the Transgender Rights issue in Skrmetti, the court seemed to almost completely went back on their decision in Obergefell by upholding the law banning gender affirming medical care for minors. However, I don’t think they were entirely wrong in their reasoning for their decision. I haven’t done enough research on the topic to be able to fully understand the impact on hormone treatments can have on children, but with the understanding that I do have, I believe that the use of hormone treatments for gender incongruence in childhood and adolescence could have a very negative affect on these kids. They don’t have the mental development to be able to fully understand the weight of their choices. Children are always changing as they are gaining more information. However, I do think that medical treatment for gender dysphoria can be done in other ways such as using the child’s preferred pronouns and letting them express themselves. That way limited harm will come to the child as they develop.

Parental Rights was definitely supported by Obergefell which was the right way to go about it. I think that same sex couple that have a child through surrogacy or assisted reproduction where they are both present at the child’s birth, they should both be able to put their names on the birth certificate as the parents of the child. The same should apply to adoption as well. Both parents should be able to legally be their parents.

The religious liberty cases, especially those that intersect with LGBTQ+ rights are the most messy. I think this is mostly due to the right to religion being a constitutional right and one of the first constitutional rights mentioned. While the subject of LGBTQ+ rights is relatively new and doesn’t have that outright mention in the Constitution because that was something that was not acknowledged and/or punished until recently.

Mallory Beatty's avatar

I find the discussion of religious liberty and LGBTQ rights interesting. It is not just a discussion of how far Obergefell extends, but how the establishment and free exercise clauses come into play. The challenge is determining how to protect LGBTQ individuals from discrimination while also respecting the religious beliefs of individuals and institutions. I think this directly connects to Obergefell's emphasis on dignity. Courts need to consider how protecting one person's religious freedom may affect another person's ability to receive equal treatment and recognition. This raises the important question: how can the law respect religious beliefs without allowing those beliefs to undermine the dignity and equality that Obergefell sought to protect? Ultimately, these cases demonstrate that constitutional rights can come into tension. The challenge is ensuring that protecting one right does not unnecessarily diminish the rights and dignity of others.