As much distaste as I have for judicial balancing, I do think it may be the best method we have for fairly adjudicating individual rights when they come in conflict with legitimate government interests. In my opinion, the position that a categorical approach reflects a "crystallized" balancing, is accurate. While I'd give due credit to the need for foreseeability and predictability to maintain a rule of law, I nonetheless think that an individualized assessment of the competing interests at stake in each case would allow the Court to evolve with the times -as the truth seeking function of freedom of speech operates to gradually erode the erroneous premises on which older decisions may have rested.
I appreciate the article's distinction between the discretion of economic liberty and the heightened scrutiny placed on freedom of speech. I think the gap derives from the inherent strength of unambiguous versus ambiguous founding language. While one demands a liberty, the other proscribes future liberties associated with due process. The ambiguous language often makes it difficult to find and define the right, but does it water-down the applied protection itself?
It makes me wonder if still today we inherently value rights that were explicitly protected in the Bill of Rights more than substantive due process rights that were derived out of the malleable word "liberty" through judicial review. In this way, it makes it easy to see how a categorical approach's protection can be so strong. It isn't up to a weighing inquiry and therefore a subjective review. Americans operate in their everyday life knowing there is a freedom of speech. There is value in the general public understanding and therefore accessing this "golden shield" so readily.
While I've always been more drawn to bright-line rules given the legal predictability and certainty provided, administrative ease, reduced discretion/more objective interpretation, etc., I do find the article's point that categorization in the free-speech context to be implicit balancing to be a good point. It's something I haven't really thought about, but I do agree that the Court is doing its own balancing at the outset and then providing a bright-line rule going forward. While the full balancing approach does come with its own problems, such as potential unpredictability/inconsistency, concerns of judicial activism, inconsistency on what is protected speech, higher litigation costs, etc., the two theories are more closely related than I had originally thought, with the key difference seeming to be when the balancing takes place and whether or not it can be further balanced later on.
Speech is, in some ways, one of the most valued and protected rights in the Court, and country's, mind. And I can understand why honestly. It's not only in the Bill of Rights, but it's also the first one. However, in my personal experience, I find many people take the sanctity of the freedom of speech and confuse It with the freedom to say anything without consequence. I think it would be safe to say most people have experienced people using freedom of speech to justify or support bigotry or hate speech. Granted, I don't know much about hate speech specifically or the difference between protected/less protected forms of speech, but I am incredibly excited to learn more about what types of speech are valued and protected the most.
Regarding the different approaches to tests---balancing versus categorizing--I always find myself leaning towards the test which is more case-by-case than bright-line rule. Even if it sacrifices predictability in some ways, I think balancing gives the justice system more room to look at cases on all sides and, hopefully, work better to achieve the most just outcome.
The question of why speech gets the golden shield compared to economic rights, I think is explainable via the political process and really some of the goals the constitution was framed around. Freedom of speech is necessary to the life of representative government as the vote of an individual is designed to be made on which candidate the individual prefers. Without free speech, voters would fail to obtain the knowledge and free thinking required to make an informed vote. Taking the block of free speech out causes the entire system to collapse.
I think the explanation of the text comparing the protection of speech to economic rights is over simplifying the situation. Suggesting that, essentially, the direct text of the first amendment says that speech is protected while economic rights are drawn from words like liberty and due process simply underestimates the ability of judges to read un-enumerated rights into the constitution. I it hard to believe that SCOTUS would feel somehow inhibited or restrained from establishing a high protection of economic rights simply because the constitution doesn't explicitly mention them by name. The answer is clearly deeper and draws on the inherent foundation that speech plays in our political society.
No, because that would assume that voters only gain political knowledge and preference based on traditional "political speech" when in reality, most thoughts and expressions can have deep impacts on ones political preference. "My neighbor's yard has a bunch of junk in it" isn't what we would traditionally label as "political speech" but easily could allow one to prefer a candidate who would enforce nuisance or zoning regulations compared to others. Most speech must be protected to preserve the political realm that we live in.
Regarding the distinction between economic and speech regulation, the consequences of striking down economic regulations leading up to and during the New Deal surely contributed to greater judicial willingness to let legislatures respond to the country's needs (which I think was necessary, even if it was not as easily justified under the Court's earlier jurisprudence). I wonder whether the fact that we have not seen a similar shift in speech jurisprudence is partly because we have not experienced a comparable crisis, like the Great Depression, for which restrictions on speech presented such a clear legislative solution. There are certainly serious and increasingly pressing harms associated with speech, but perhaps those harms are less directly redressable through legislation (or at least there is less agreement about what an effective legislative response would look like).
Additionally, I think the justifications you provided for the "golden shield" provide a compelling explanation for why this distinction might be justified. Relating this to the development of tiers of scrutiny, speech regulation seems to implicate two of Justice Stone's concerns in Carolene Products footnote four: explicit constitutional protections (the First Amendment) and legislation that interferes with the political processes ordinarily relied upon to correct undesirable laws. In that sense, the different treatment of economic and speech regulations seems justified.
I also find Justice Frankfurter's argument against an absolutist approach persuasive because his point that courts will inevitably balance competing interests when speech rights collide with other concerns, and that judges should not be permitted to hide that balancing, seems to carry over into the categorization versus balancing debate. Categorization surely does provide greater predictability, but I do not think that predictability is as clear as it is argued, as judges still exercise considerable discretion in determining which categories exist, how they are defined, and whether particular speech falls within them. To me, this somewhat undermines the argument for categorization, and I think there is value in making underlying judgments more explicit via balancing, even if doing so sacrifices some predictability.
I think your observation about the New Deal is interesting, especially the idea that the different trajectories of economic and speech regulation reflect the kinds of crises the Court has had to confront. But does the distinction also have to do with the nature of the government power involved? When the government regulates economic activity, for the most part, we trust the political process to correct bad policy choices. But when it regulates speech, especially political speech, it is interfering with the very process through which those corrections would occur. That’s why the connection to Carolene Products fn 4 is so important.
On whether categorization eliminates judicial discretion - it is true that judges still have to decide how categories are defined and which speech falls within them. But even though categorical rules aren’t perfectly predictable, would you agree that they still constrain judicial discretion more effectively than open-ended balancing? And is there value in those constraints even when they sometimes produce outcomes we find difficult to justify?
The fact that regulating speech can interfere with the very political process through which problematic regulations would otherwise be corrected is probably a much stronger justification for the distinction, and I think you put it in a way that makes footnote four, and precisely what Justice Stone was arguing, make a lot more sense to me.
As for categorization versus balancing, I am still somewhat torn between the two approaches. I agree that predictability is a much greater concern with open-ended balancing and that categorical rules can provide constraints on judicial discretion, but I still think categorization is far from immune to similar concerns. To some extent, I think this is reflected in our equal protection discussions, where the categorization of classifications and corresponding levels of scrutiny can itself be consequential and subject to judicial disagreement.
The question between a balanced and nuanced case-by-case basis for examining speech protection cases and that of a more strict "rule-based" approach typical to other categorical tests employed by the Court, has merit on both sides. In general, I tend to believe (across other case-types and questions the Court receives), that often strict scrutiny (especially when the case revolves around either the fundamental liberties question or the historical nuance of their equal distribution) should be a more typically-invoked baseline (because in spite of a potential hit to judicial efficiency, these issues and their ramifications can be broad and impactful (both in individual case and in the abstract). Therefore, with a right as deeply entrenched as "freedom of speech", I would typically argue that most (even Black made exceptions, in spite of "total adherence" characterization) challenges, especially those facially descriptive prohibitions, deserve strict scrutiny. However, as is typical across these sorts of case classification questions, there is an issue with supposing that justices and political actors, who are otherwise human, must engage only with the narrowed and context-drained fact patterns and considerations of the modern era and arising issue, combined with those older subjective beliefs based around historical perceptions (which are then often legitimized in eyes of Court majority as "common consensus", in spite of countless examples of this argument being directly disputed by historical contemporaries, now being treated with objectivity) and thus arguing in the conversation or analysis with a total lack of nuance, but for the previously culturally dominant consensus. In general, I tend to be one who advocates for a wider and more nuanced review of the record, and from a wider variety of reputable sources, than simply relying upon the good-faith effort of justices who, will likely inevitably, bring in their own perceptions and anecdotal recollections of outside context to a case. Therefore, where fact patterns show reasoning that would cause a departure from otherwise stringent and, almost-procedural, outcomes under the tiers of scrutiny, the Court should not throw a blanket over the issue nor their own eyes.
As a brief aside, in reference to Holmes' foundational quote: "You can regulate commerce all you want; bad tax policy won’t end human progress. But if you regulate thought, 'the process of thought itself becomes checked and atrophied.' Speech is how we adapt and evolve."; I'll have to disagree to an extent. I agree with his take that speech and public opinion is an important aspect to how a society (and especially one organized according to generally "democratic" principles) grows and evolves. I also agree that, yes, speech regulation should be viewed with more scrutiny than economic prohibitions or conditions imposed. However, to reduce economic regulation, and the broader world of material condition, to a simple question of what someone does or does not have, or is or is not entitled to, is to miss the point on how it informs development of culture and independent character, nature of interpersonal relationships, class distinctions, and access to ideas or security of thought in general (among other more nuanced informal phenomenon that nonetheless end up in more personal realm than the broad label of "economics" is typically characterized). To claim therefore, in general, (and yes I'm being nitpicky) that the realm of economics cannot, or does not, inform the healthy facilitation and evolution of a democratic society, is to miss one of the biggest points. **No I will not be elaborating further on this paragraph's point here, because it's outside the scope of the discussion, and honestly our Constitutional scheme as its been molded since independence, does not (in a way I can formulate) even carve out a distinction of this general principle.
I think your last point gets to the heart of what Profs. Sunstein and Fiss argue. They question whether protecting speech from government interference produces a genuinely free marketplace of ideas. If economic inequalities shape who has meaningful access to public debate, then economic conditions are intrinsically connected to free speech. Fiss argues that government intervention can sometimes advance First Amendment values.
I think your point, though, is in some tension with your argument in favor of strict scrutiny as the general rule. If existing inequalities can distort public discourse, and government regulation can sometimes make speech more free, does a general presumption of strict scrutiny leave enough room for that possibility? How should courts account for these competing concerns?
I liked that the article pointed out that Justice Holmes was in favor of regulating a bakery but not your speech. The article also adds that speech gets the golden shield because regulating speech then regulates thoughts, and that is essential for society to adapt and evolve. However, I do think there is a harm presented from absolutely no boundaries on what is allowed to flourish in the public sphere. I believe the court should always look to the context and nuance surrounding the speech at issue. I think balancing is the best approach when dealing with First Amendment cases, as the article points out, because it leaves the most room for fairness and freedom.
Like many others, I find myself more in favor of a balancing approach to first amendment challenges. Historically, brightline rules have proven to fail speakers and courts again and again. While a balancing approach undoubtedly risks creating uneven results, I think there may be ways to establish guardrails to prevent unjust balancing from occurring. Do I have an idea of what those guardrails are? Not quite. But I think that "we" (I) might be internally escalating the dangers presented by a lack of predictability.
One part of this article that stood out to me was the difference between categorization and balancing. Categorization gives clear rules, so people know ahead of time what kind of speech is protected and what is not. Balancing looks at each situation on its own, which makes it more flexible but also harder to predict. It reminded me of how rules work in everyday life, like at school or in sports. Some rules are strict and easy to follow, while others depend on the referee or teacher looking at what actually happened. Both approaches have good and bad sides, and it makes sense that the Court ends up using a mix of the two. I also thought it was interesting that the same debate shows up in other areas of the law, like with Justice Stevens and equal protection. It shows that judges are always trying to find the right balance between having clear rules and being fair to each unique situation.
I think the idea the argument of the balancists and the absolutists. It is easy to say, without thoroughly analyzing that freedom of speech affords citizens the right to say whatever they want. I like the idea that both arguments can be seen as correct because they overlap, despite arguing for directly different outcomes.
A big disagreement was how speech in protests work since their can be harmful speech, or symbolism shown. Frankfurter holds the view that we need to weigh the harms of what is being put out there with the right for individual's freedom of speech. Black, the absolutist, believes that this wqas mere symbolism and cannot be restircted due to free speech. This showed that this problem different the two opinions were more about the philosophy of the right to free speech instead of the outcome. I found this interesting because in the past I have always thought about violating the 1st amendment as very outcome-based as to what was said, and whether it crosses an imaginary line. This argument shows there is a lot more to think about when considering whether the first amendment's right to speech was violated, and why is was violated.
Thanks for this comment, Zack. First Amendment analysis is definitely about more than determining whether particular speech crosses a line. It also asks how that line should be drawn in the first place, what values free speech is meant to protect (the four theories of free speech that we discussed), and how much discretion judges should have to weigh those values against competing interests. The disagreement between Black and Frankfurter reflects these deeper questions, particularly the last one.
As an aside, I love the description of American interest in free speech as "bordering on paranoia." I often times feel like our perception as Americans as living in the land of the free clashes with the reality of the world that we live in where nearly 2 million Americans are incarcerated and the government can penalize your livelihood for participating in "unsanctioned foreign boycotts"(Anti-Boycott Act of 2018), and recently even more strict penalization for political participation (Countering Hate Against Israel by Federal Contractors Act, 2025). And yet, we as Americans are free to spread hate-speech online, form manosphere groups on 4-chan, burn crosses in front of their Black neighbors homes, and (one of the most insidious I believe) spread blatant lies, misinformation, and conspiracy theories as truth leading to suspicion in vaccines, nutrition, science, history, and the very foundations of our government.
Why is our government giving us enough rope to hang ourselves with free speech but is has trampled all over the fourth amendment. The government is allowed to stop all citizens on the streets, surveil our homes from above, spy on our private electronic communications, and track our locations. And of course there is the recent overturning of Roe v. Wade.
There has been a gradual erosion of the protection from government searches and intrusions into private lives while upholding the right to share information that has real harm yet still allowing the government to wield its economic power to punish political action. The whole thing feels distinctly hypocritical and partisan.
Personally, if I am living in the so-called land of the free and I have to slog through hate speech, misinformation, online threats, etc., then I also want the government to quit peeping through my windows and spying on my phone calls.
It seems like balancing both categorization and balancing for deciding on protecting speech would help counteract each other’s weaknesses. I think I prefer balancing though because it lets courts consider factors that don’t always match earlier cases. However, giving judges more flexibility can be concerning because their own views can sway the outcome, and people might hold back from speaking.
I understand why the freedom of speech is an important right. However, I do think that some people, even Justices, abuse this freedom. I also think that while people are allowed to express their views, a lot of things get censured by governments, corporations, and algorithms within apps.I do agree with the categorizations of speech by helping to create a sense of “appropriate” speech and how they balance with each other and the interests of the individual and the state.
The economic vs. speech separation and the tiers of scrutiny were conceived in the same place, our forever favorite, Carolene Products footnote 4, which basically says economic stuff gets deferential treatment, but speech, political process rights, and discrete and insular minorities get heightened judicial review. So the tiers of scrutiny supply the golden shield to speech. Like in Cleburne the majority says “rational basis!!!”, and then strikes the law anyway because it smelled like prejudice. If the label doesn’t predict the outcome, maybe the tiers really are hiding value judgments, like he said. Balancing might just be more upfront about what judges already do.
As for freedom of speech and the layman, it is often used as a shield for hateful speech. As Anabelle said, people expect the freedom of speech to shield them from the consequences GENERALLY, when it exists to protect them from tyranny and the government silencing them.
One of the reasons that speech gets the "golden shield" is because the right was extremely important to the ideas this country was built upon. Something that is really interesting about speech is how broad of an area it covers. The court has interpreted it to apply to the political process through voting and campaigns. The court has also interpreted to apply to flag burning and silent expression. Because the right to speech is so encompassing, I think this is why the court has a hard time interpreting freedom of speech matters using the rigid three tiers of scrutiny test that Stevens takes issue with. I also think that the difference between economic regulation and speech regulation is an interesting point to discuss. Speech is so broad and likely includes a range of economic activities. The line between what is economic activity and what is speech is a difficult line to draw and makes Justice Holmes idea contradictory.
As much distaste as I have for judicial balancing, I do think it may be the best method we have for fairly adjudicating individual rights when they come in conflict with legitimate government interests. In my opinion, the position that a categorical approach reflects a "crystallized" balancing, is accurate. While I'd give due credit to the need for foreseeability and predictability to maintain a rule of law, I nonetheless think that an individualized assessment of the competing interests at stake in each case would allow the Court to evolve with the times -as the truth seeking function of freedom of speech operates to gradually erode the erroneous premises on which older decisions may have rested.
I appreciate the article's distinction between the discretion of economic liberty and the heightened scrutiny placed on freedom of speech. I think the gap derives from the inherent strength of unambiguous versus ambiguous founding language. While one demands a liberty, the other proscribes future liberties associated with due process. The ambiguous language often makes it difficult to find and define the right, but does it water-down the applied protection itself?
It makes me wonder if still today we inherently value rights that were explicitly protected in the Bill of Rights more than substantive due process rights that were derived out of the malleable word "liberty" through judicial review. In this way, it makes it easy to see how a categorical approach's protection can be so strong. It isn't up to a weighing inquiry and therefore a subjective review. Americans operate in their everyday life knowing there is a freedom of speech. There is value in the general public understanding and therefore accessing this "golden shield" so readily.
While I've always been more drawn to bright-line rules given the legal predictability and certainty provided, administrative ease, reduced discretion/more objective interpretation, etc., I do find the article's point that categorization in the free-speech context to be implicit balancing to be a good point. It's something I haven't really thought about, but I do agree that the Court is doing its own balancing at the outset and then providing a bright-line rule going forward. While the full balancing approach does come with its own problems, such as potential unpredictability/inconsistency, concerns of judicial activism, inconsistency on what is protected speech, higher litigation costs, etc., the two theories are more closely related than I had originally thought, with the key difference seeming to be when the balancing takes place and whether or not it can be further balanced later on.
Speech is, in some ways, one of the most valued and protected rights in the Court, and country's, mind. And I can understand why honestly. It's not only in the Bill of Rights, but it's also the first one. However, in my personal experience, I find many people take the sanctity of the freedom of speech and confuse It with the freedom to say anything without consequence. I think it would be safe to say most people have experienced people using freedom of speech to justify or support bigotry or hate speech. Granted, I don't know much about hate speech specifically or the difference between protected/less protected forms of speech, but I am incredibly excited to learn more about what types of speech are valued and protected the most.
Regarding the different approaches to tests---balancing versus categorizing--I always find myself leaning towards the test which is more case-by-case than bright-line rule. Even if it sacrifices predictability in some ways, I think balancing gives the justice system more room to look at cases on all sides and, hopefully, work better to achieve the most just outcome.
The question of why speech gets the golden shield compared to economic rights, I think is explainable via the political process and really some of the goals the constitution was framed around. Freedom of speech is necessary to the life of representative government as the vote of an individual is designed to be made on which candidate the individual prefers. Without free speech, voters would fail to obtain the knowledge and free thinking required to make an informed vote. Taking the block of free speech out causes the entire system to collapse.
I think the explanation of the text comparing the protection of speech to economic rights is over simplifying the situation. Suggesting that, essentially, the direct text of the first amendment says that speech is protected while economic rights are drawn from words like liberty and due process simply underestimates the ability of judges to read un-enumerated rights into the constitution. I it hard to believe that SCOTUS would feel somehow inhibited or restrained from establishing a high protection of economic rights simply because the constitution doesn't explicitly mention them by name. The answer is clearly deeper and draws on the inherent foundation that speech plays in our political society.
Is it advisable, then, to just protect political speech and not protect - or give lesser protections - to nonpolitical speech?
No, because that would assume that voters only gain political knowledge and preference based on traditional "political speech" when in reality, most thoughts and expressions can have deep impacts on ones political preference. "My neighbor's yard has a bunch of junk in it" isn't what we would traditionally label as "political speech" but easily could allow one to prefer a candidate who would enforce nuisance or zoning regulations compared to others. Most speech must be protected to preserve the political realm that we live in.
Regarding the distinction between economic and speech regulation, the consequences of striking down economic regulations leading up to and during the New Deal surely contributed to greater judicial willingness to let legislatures respond to the country's needs (which I think was necessary, even if it was not as easily justified under the Court's earlier jurisprudence). I wonder whether the fact that we have not seen a similar shift in speech jurisprudence is partly because we have not experienced a comparable crisis, like the Great Depression, for which restrictions on speech presented such a clear legislative solution. There are certainly serious and increasingly pressing harms associated with speech, but perhaps those harms are less directly redressable through legislation (or at least there is less agreement about what an effective legislative response would look like).
Additionally, I think the justifications you provided for the "golden shield" provide a compelling explanation for why this distinction might be justified. Relating this to the development of tiers of scrutiny, speech regulation seems to implicate two of Justice Stone's concerns in Carolene Products footnote four: explicit constitutional protections (the First Amendment) and legislation that interferes with the political processes ordinarily relied upon to correct undesirable laws. In that sense, the different treatment of economic and speech regulations seems justified.
I also find Justice Frankfurter's argument against an absolutist approach persuasive because his point that courts will inevitably balance competing interests when speech rights collide with other concerns, and that judges should not be permitted to hide that balancing, seems to carry over into the categorization versus balancing debate. Categorization surely does provide greater predictability, but I do not think that predictability is as clear as it is argued, as judges still exercise considerable discretion in determining which categories exist, how they are defined, and whether particular speech falls within them. To me, this somewhat undermines the argument for categorization, and I think there is value in making underlying judgments more explicit via balancing, even if doing so sacrifices some predictability.
I think your observation about the New Deal is interesting, especially the idea that the different trajectories of economic and speech regulation reflect the kinds of crises the Court has had to confront. But does the distinction also have to do with the nature of the government power involved? When the government regulates economic activity, for the most part, we trust the political process to correct bad policy choices. But when it regulates speech, especially political speech, it is interfering with the very process through which those corrections would occur. That’s why the connection to Carolene Products fn 4 is so important.
On whether categorization eliminates judicial discretion - it is true that judges still have to decide how categories are defined and which speech falls within them. But even though categorical rules aren’t perfectly predictable, would you agree that they still constrain judicial discretion more effectively than open-ended balancing? And is there value in those constraints even when they sometimes produce outcomes we find difficult to justify?
The fact that regulating speech can interfere with the very political process through which problematic regulations would otherwise be corrected is probably a much stronger justification for the distinction, and I think you put it in a way that makes footnote four, and precisely what Justice Stone was arguing, make a lot more sense to me.
As for categorization versus balancing, I am still somewhat torn between the two approaches. I agree that predictability is a much greater concern with open-ended balancing and that categorical rules can provide constraints on judicial discretion, but I still think categorization is far from immune to similar concerns. To some extent, I think this is reflected in our equal protection discussions, where the categorization of classifications and corresponding levels of scrutiny can itself be consequential and subject to judicial disagreement.
The question between a balanced and nuanced case-by-case basis for examining speech protection cases and that of a more strict "rule-based" approach typical to other categorical tests employed by the Court, has merit on both sides. In general, I tend to believe (across other case-types and questions the Court receives), that often strict scrutiny (especially when the case revolves around either the fundamental liberties question or the historical nuance of their equal distribution) should be a more typically-invoked baseline (because in spite of a potential hit to judicial efficiency, these issues and their ramifications can be broad and impactful (both in individual case and in the abstract). Therefore, with a right as deeply entrenched as "freedom of speech", I would typically argue that most (even Black made exceptions, in spite of "total adherence" characterization) challenges, especially those facially descriptive prohibitions, deserve strict scrutiny. However, as is typical across these sorts of case classification questions, there is an issue with supposing that justices and political actors, who are otherwise human, must engage only with the narrowed and context-drained fact patterns and considerations of the modern era and arising issue, combined with those older subjective beliefs based around historical perceptions (which are then often legitimized in eyes of Court majority as "common consensus", in spite of countless examples of this argument being directly disputed by historical contemporaries, now being treated with objectivity) and thus arguing in the conversation or analysis with a total lack of nuance, but for the previously culturally dominant consensus. In general, I tend to be one who advocates for a wider and more nuanced review of the record, and from a wider variety of reputable sources, than simply relying upon the good-faith effort of justices who, will likely inevitably, bring in their own perceptions and anecdotal recollections of outside context to a case. Therefore, where fact patterns show reasoning that would cause a departure from otherwise stringent and, almost-procedural, outcomes under the tiers of scrutiny, the Court should not throw a blanket over the issue nor their own eyes.
As a brief aside, in reference to Holmes' foundational quote: "You can regulate commerce all you want; bad tax policy won’t end human progress. But if you regulate thought, 'the process of thought itself becomes checked and atrophied.' Speech is how we adapt and evolve."; I'll have to disagree to an extent. I agree with his take that speech and public opinion is an important aspect to how a society (and especially one organized according to generally "democratic" principles) grows and evolves. I also agree that, yes, speech regulation should be viewed with more scrutiny than economic prohibitions or conditions imposed. However, to reduce economic regulation, and the broader world of material condition, to a simple question of what someone does or does not have, or is or is not entitled to, is to miss the point on how it informs development of culture and independent character, nature of interpersonal relationships, class distinctions, and access to ideas or security of thought in general (among other more nuanced informal phenomenon that nonetheless end up in more personal realm than the broad label of "economics" is typically characterized). To claim therefore, in general, (and yes I'm being nitpicky) that the realm of economics cannot, or does not, inform the healthy facilitation and evolution of a democratic society, is to miss one of the biggest points. **No I will not be elaborating further on this paragraph's point here, because it's outside the scope of the discussion, and honestly our Constitutional scheme as its been molded since independence, does not (in a way I can formulate) even carve out a distinction of this general principle.
I think your last point gets to the heart of what Profs. Sunstein and Fiss argue. They question whether protecting speech from government interference produces a genuinely free marketplace of ideas. If economic inequalities shape who has meaningful access to public debate, then economic conditions are intrinsically connected to free speech. Fiss argues that government intervention can sometimes advance First Amendment values.
I think your point, though, is in some tension with your argument in favor of strict scrutiny as the general rule. If existing inequalities can distort public discourse, and government regulation can sometimes make speech more free, does a general presumption of strict scrutiny leave enough room for that possibility? How should courts account for these competing concerns?
I liked that the article pointed out that Justice Holmes was in favor of regulating a bakery but not your speech. The article also adds that speech gets the golden shield because regulating speech then regulates thoughts, and that is essential for society to adapt and evolve. However, I do think there is a harm presented from absolutely no boundaries on what is allowed to flourish in the public sphere. I believe the court should always look to the context and nuance surrounding the speech at issue. I think balancing is the best approach when dealing with First Amendment cases, as the article points out, because it leaves the most room for fairness and freedom.
Are you concerned, though, that a flexible standard leaves too much room for judicial discretion?
Like many others, I find myself more in favor of a balancing approach to first amendment challenges. Historically, brightline rules have proven to fail speakers and courts again and again. While a balancing approach undoubtedly risks creating uneven results, I think there may be ways to establish guardrails to prevent unjust balancing from occurring. Do I have an idea of what those guardrails are? Not quite. But I think that "we" (I) might be internally escalating the dangers presented by a lack of predictability.
One part of this article that stood out to me was the difference between categorization and balancing. Categorization gives clear rules, so people know ahead of time what kind of speech is protected and what is not. Balancing looks at each situation on its own, which makes it more flexible but also harder to predict. It reminded me of how rules work in everyday life, like at school or in sports. Some rules are strict and easy to follow, while others depend on the referee or teacher looking at what actually happened. Both approaches have good and bad sides, and it makes sense that the Court ends up using a mix of the two. I also thought it was interesting that the same debate shows up in other areas of the law, like with Justice Stevens and equal protection. It shows that judges are always trying to find the right balance between having clear rules and being fair to each unique situation.
I think the idea the argument of the balancists and the absolutists. It is easy to say, without thoroughly analyzing that freedom of speech affords citizens the right to say whatever they want. I like the idea that both arguments can be seen as correct because they overlap, despite arguing for directly different outcomes.
A big disagreement was how speech in protests work since their can be harmful speech, or symbolism shown. Frankfurter holds the view that we need to weigh the harms of what is being put out there with the right for individual's freedom of speech. Black, the absolutist, believes that this wqas mere symbolism and cannot be restircted due to free speech. This showed that this problem different the two opinions were more about the philosophy of the right to free speech instead of the outcome. I found this interesting because in the past I have always thought about violating the 1st amendment as very outcome-based as to what was said, and whether it crosses an imaginary line. This argument shows there is a lot more to think about when considering whether the first amendment's right to speech was violated, and why is was violated.
Thanks for this comment, Zack. First Amendment analysis is definitely about more than determining whether particular speech crosses a line. It also asks how that line should be drawn in the first place, what values free speech is meant to protect (the four theories of free speech that we discussed), and how much discretion judges should have to weigh those values against competing interests. The disagreement between Black and Frankfurter reflects these deeper questions, particularly the last one.
As an aside, I love the description of American interest in free speech as "bordering on paranoia." I often times feel like our perception as Americans as living in the land of the free clashes with the reality of the world that we live in where nearly 2 million Americans are incarcerated and the government can penalize your livelihood for participating in "unsanctioned foreign boycotts"(Anti-Boycott Act of 2018), and recently even more strict penalization for political participation (Countering Hate Against Israel by Federal Contractors Act, 2025). And yet, we as Americans are free to spread hate-speech online, form manosphere groups on 4-chan, burn crosses in front of their Black neighbors homes, and (one of the most insidious I believe) spread blatant lies, misinformation, and conspiracy theories as truth leading to suspicion in vaccines, nutrition, science, history, and the very foundations of our government.
Why is our government giving us enough rope to hang ourselves with free speech but is has trampled all over the fourth amendment. The government is allowed to stop all citizens on the streets, surveil our homes from above, spy on our private electronic communications, and track our locations. And of course there is the recent overturning of Roe v. Wade.
There has been a gradual erosion of the protection from government searches and intrusions into private lives while upholding the right to share information that has real harm yet still allowing the government to wield its economic power to punish political action. The whole thing feels distinctly hypocritical and partisan.
Personally, if I am living in the so-called land of the free and I have to slog through hate speech, misinformation, online threats, etc., then I also want the government to quit peeping through my windows and spying on my phone calls.
It seems like balancing both categorization and balancing for deciding on protecting speech would help counteract each other’s weaknesses. I think I prefer balancing though because it lets courts consider factors that don’t always match earlier cases. However, giving judges more flexibility can be concerning because their own views can sway the outcome, and people might hold back from speaking.
I understand why the freedom of speech is an important right. However, I do think that some people, even Justices, abuse this freedom. I also think that while people are allowed to express their views, a lot of things get censured by governments, corporations, and algorithms within apps.I do agree with the categorizations of speech by helping to create a sense of “appropriate” speech and how they balance with each other and the interests of the individual and the state.
The economic vs. speech separation and the tiers of scrutiny were conceived in the same place, our forever favorite, Carolene Products footnote 4, which basically says economic stuff gets deferential treatment, but speech, political process rights, and discrete and insular minorities get heightened judicial review. So the tiers of scrutiny supply the golden shield to speech. Like in Cleburne the majority says “rational basis!!!”, and then strikes the law anyway because it smelled like prejudice. If the label doesn’t predict the outcome, maybe the tiers really are hiding value judgments, like he said. Balancing might just be more upfront about what judges already do.
As for freedom of speech and the layman, it is often used as a shield for hateful speech. As Anabelle said, people expect the freedom of speech to shield them from the consequences GENERALLY, when it exists to protect them from tyranny and the government silencing them.
One of the reasons that speech gets the "golden shield" is because the right was extremely important to the ideas this country was built upon. Something that is really interesting about speech is how broad of an area it covers. The court has interpreted it to apply to the political process through voting and campaigns. The court has also interpreted to apply to flag burning and silent expression. Because the right to speech is so encompassing, I think this is why the court has a hard time interpreting freedom of speech matters using the rigid three tiers of scrutiny test that Stevens takes issue with. I also think that the difference between economic regulation and speech regulation is an interesting point to discuss. Speech is so broad and likely includes a range of economic activities. The line between what is economic activity and what is speech is a difficult line to draw and makes Justice Holmes idea contradictory.