I agree with Olivia that one of the more imperative points is the fact that the framers left the constitutional gaps because they assumed leaders would respect limits even when inconvenient. I think that Framers were relying on this in the hope that political leaders would respect the gaps that they left for judgment with the goal of ensuring the best decisions were made based on the particular situation. It was fair for the framers to assume officials would act in good faith when interpreting these gaps in the Constitution, however, was it unlikely that this would've eventually been taken advantage of? I do wonder if they thought about the possibility of this and weighed that chance against the need for these gaps.
These norms are clearly essential to making the U.S. system work and historically officials have honored them. The clear shift in this dynamic where presidents are now pushing boundaries and are concerned with political gain could cause a large variety of issues. Once presidents are able to ignore court orders and sidestep the Senate, the protections that we all count on are put in jeopardy. It is difficult to imagine how far and detrimental this could possibly reach if these norms and boundaries are constantly pushed and broken for individual political gain.
I think that the most imperative point here is the fact that "[t]he Framers left constitutional gaps because they assumed leaders would respect limits even when inconvenient." The Framers made this deliberate choice under the assumption that leaders would honors limits, for trusting that ambition and accountability would reinforce rather than crumble the system.
For must of history, this assumption held; even when presidents tested boundaries, political costs and institutional checks eventually reasserted constitutional norms.
However, the current danger is that these gaps, which were once respected, have become vulnerabilities and liabilities. The Framers left space for judgment and respect, but when that respect erodes, so does the reliability of core protections for citizens. This is why the erosion of norms is not just an institution problem; it is a direct threat to different implicit guarantees that the Framers intended to provide.
Right—if leaders stop respecting limits, it’s not just norms at risk. The rights themselves start to shrink because the guardrails meant to protect them no longer hold. Think about free speech: if those in power decide criticism of government is “too disruptive,” the right quickly becomes conditional and loses its force.
I found myself interested in this idea of failed backlash from Congress/Courts when the Executive oversteps its power. Where the "safeguards" fail seems to be the beginning of the confusion of a public accustomed to, for example, seeing headlines announcing extreme action from the House only to be stopped and diluted by the Senate (or vise versa). If the line of question continues extending, I think it has to venture into the realm of answering 1) Why has ambition not created ambitious institutional rivalry? 2) If it has created rivalry, what has prevented it from being effective? 3) What is the fodder for re-starting the backlash mechanisms? For this last question, I think a return to Audre Lorde's sentiment of "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house" could prove to be useful food for thought. If there are now (and have always been) informal rules that function as boundary-checking, which ones were overcome that allowed the snowballing effect we are seeing the present day? I'm tempted to say that the main catalyst has been the increasingly concerning growth of the far-right/disappearance of the "moderate" which many scholars point to Trump's first presidency to explain, but even that feels too simple now.
When you say that "the document’s deliberate ambiguity wasn’t a flaw but a key feature, and it depended on leaders respecting the system even when breaking it might offer short-term advantage," I can't help but think of this the other way around.
What if the the document’s deliberate ambiguity was a key feature specifically BECAUSE it allowed leaders to buck against the system for short-term advantage. Is there any evidence that the framers were particularly optimistic about the goodwill of America's future leaders? Or is there a chance that they relied on norms with the intention that they could be broken without steep judicial consequence?
That’s such an interesting reframing. There’s some evidence that the framers intentionally built in ambiguity, not so much because they wanted leaders to break norms, but because they understood that no fixed text could cover every situation. They expected disputes to be resolved through politics and norms rather than constant judicial policing.
For example, Hamilton in Federalist 70 emphasized the need for “energy in the executive,” which implies a certain flexibility, while Madison in Federalist 51 assumed that ambition would counteract ambition through institutional rivalry. They didn’t assume future leaders would always be virtuous, but they did assume political cost and public accountability would keep boundary-pushing in check.
So, rather than designing a system where norm-breaking was meant to be harmless, they created one where occasional norm-breaking could happen but was supposed to trigger backlash (from Congress, courts, voters). What my post was trying to get at is that the backlash mechanism isn’t working the same way. Norm-breaking has become a source of political strength rather than a liability, which flips the framers’ assumptions on their head.
I agree with Olivia that one of the more imperative points is the fact that the framers left the constitutional gaps because they assumed leaders would respect limits even when inconvenient. I think that Framers were relying on this in the hope that political leaders would respect the gaps that they left for judgment with the goal of ensuring the best decisions were made based on the particular situation. It was fair for the framers to assume officials would act in good faith when interpreting these gaps in the Constitution, however, was it unlikely that this would've eventually been taken advantage of? I do wonder if they thought about the possibility of this and weighed that chance against the need for these gaps.
These norms are clearly essential to making the U.S. system work and historically officials have honored them. The clear shift in this dynamic where presidents are now pushing boundaries and are concerned with political gain could cause a large variety of issues. Once presidents are able to ignore court orders and sidestep the Senate, the protections that we all count on are put in jeopardy. It is difficult to imagine how far and detrimental this could possibly reach if these norms and boundaries are constantly pushed and broken for individual political gain.
I think that the most imperative point here is the fact that "[t]he Framers left constitutional gaps because they assumed leaders would respect limits even when inconvenient." The Framers made this deliberate choice under the assumption that leaders would honors limits, for trusting that ambition and accountability would reinforce rather than crumble the system.
For must of history, this assumption held; even when presidents tested boundaries, political costs and institutional checks eventually reasserted constitutional norms.
However, the current danger is that these gaps, which were once respected, have become vulnerabilities and liabilities. The Framers left space for judgment and respect, but when that respect erodes, so does the reliability of core protections for citizens. This is why the erosion of norms is not just an institution problem; it is a direct threat to different implicit guarantees that the Framers intended to provide.
Right—if leaders stop respecting limits, it’s not just norms at risk. The rights themselves start to shrink because the guardrails meant to protect them no longer hold. Think about free speech: if those in power decide criticism of government is “too disruptive,” the right quickly becomes conditional and loses its force.
I found myself interested in this idea of failed backlash from Congress/Courts when the Executive oversteps its power. Where the "safeguards" fail seems to be the beginning of the confusion of a public accustomed to, for example, seeing headlines announcing extreme action from the House only to be stopped and diluted by the Senate (or vise versa). If the line of question continues extending, I think it has to venture into the realm of answering 1) Why has ambition not created ambitious institutional rivalry? 2) If it has created rivalry, what has prevented it from being effective? 3) What is the fodder for re-starting the backlash mechanisms? For this last question, I think a return to Audre Lorde's sentiment of "the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house" could prove to be useful food for thought. If there are now (and have always been) informal rules that function as boundary-checking, which ones were overcome that allowed the snowballing effect we are seeing the present day? I'm tempted to say that the main catalyst has been the increasingly concerning growth of the far-right/disappearance of the "moderate" which many scholars point to Trump's first presidency to explain, but even that feels too simple now.
When you say that "the document’s deliberate ambiguity wasn’t a flaw but a key feature, and it depended on leaders respecting the system even when breaking it might offer short-term advantage," I can't help but think of this the other way around.
What if the the document’s deliberate ambiguity was a key feature specifically BECAUSE it allowed leaders to buck against the system for short-term advantage. Is there any evidence that the framers were particularly optimistic about the goodwill of America's future leaders? Or is there a chance that they relied on norms with the intention that they could be broken without steep judicial consequence?
That’s such an interesting reframing. There’s some evidence that the framers intentionally built in ambiguity, not so much because they wanted leaders to break norms, but because they understood that no fixed text could cover every situation. They expected disputes to be resolved through politics and norms rather than constant judicial policing.
For example, Hamilton in Federalist 70 emphasized the need for “energy in the executive,” which implies a certain flexibility, while Madison in Federalist 51 assumed that ambition would counteract ambition through institutional rivalry. They didn’t assume future leaders would always be virtuous, but they did assume political cost and public accountability would keep boundary-pushing in check.
So, rather than designing a system where norm-breaking was meant to be harmless, they created one where occasional norm-breaking could happen but was supposed to trigger backlash (from Congress, courts, voters). What my post was trying to get at is that the backlash mechanism isn’t working the same way. Norm-breaking has become a source of political strength rather than a liability, which flips the framers’ assumptions on their head.